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I. INTRODUCTION
When a business approaches an institutional lender for
financing, a positive credit judgment will be based upon an
analysis of the ability of the business as a whole to repay the
obligation. If the operations are divided into more than a single
corporate entity, however, the primary obligation to repay must
be undertaken by one member of the corporate group while the
remaining legally distinct entities can be rendered secondarily
liable through the execution of guaranties of repayment.' The
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I The principal obligor-guarantor structure is certainly the most common manner
in which to structure such a transaction. One alternative sometimes utilized by financial
institutions is to provide for joint and several liability among all the entities in the
corporate group. The distinction, however, is illusory because, in the typical case, the
loan proceeds and their repayment will be channeled through the parent or dominant
corporation in accordance with its financial plan. Thus, the benefits and burdens are
not shared equally, and the transaction is subject to the same challenges discussed
herein in the context of the obligor-guarantor structure.
Another alternative, with significant substantive distinctions, is for a lender to re-
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question then arises whether such guaranties give the lender a
right to the assets of the guarantor equal to or, if the guaranty is
secured, senior to that of the guarantor's other creditors. There
are two principal theories on the basis of which other creditors
might defeat such a preference. The guaranty and any support-
ing security transactions might be avoided under the law of
fraudulent conveyances or, in the bankruptcy context, there
might be an involuntary subordination of the lender's claim
under the bankruptcy doctrine of equitable subordination.' This
quire the loan proceeds to be distributed among the members of a corporate group pro
rata and to hold each entity responsible in turn only for the consideration it actually
received. This approach is seldom practical, however, because cash needs can vary
greatly even among the members of a closely knit corporate group. Moreover, asset
distribution among the group's members is often widely disparate, and the lender's
credit determination, therefore, will likely emphasize the more substantial entities; it is
only on the creditworthiness of the better endowed members that the others can obtain
financing at all.
2 As a general principle, the Bankruptcy Act provides for equality of distribution in
the payment of a bankrupt's creditors. Section 65a of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (1970), provides that "[d]ividends of an equal per centum shall be declared and
paid on all allowed claims, except such as have priority or are secured." Other than
§ 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970), which specifically sets forth
certain types of debts that shall be paid prior to the general creditors, no provisions in
the Bankruptcy Act contravene the principle of equal distribution.
Notwithstanding the absence of statutory authority, however, the bankruptcy court
can and does subordinate certain claims to others when the surrounding circumstances
so warrant. The court's ability to $ubordinate these claims rests in its status as a court of
equity. Section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970), specifically vests
"such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable [the courts] to exercise original
jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act." (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, the au-
thority of the bankruptcy court to exercise the power of equitable subordination has
been recognized clearly by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co.,
306 U.S. 307 (1939).
The scope and purpose of these equitable powers have been stated as follows:
[R]easons of equity may require that a claim or interest be subordinated to
all other claims or interests or certain classes of them, such as where the holder
is involved in a close interrelationship with the debtor and by some previous
inequitable conduct is deemed estopped to claim parity with other claims or
interests of the same class. The most common uses of subordination are to
nullify the effect of any fraud that a creditor has committed, to prevent unjust
enrichment from or redress a wrong arising out of a fiduciary relation, and to
make the transactions of officers with a debtor corporation and between parent
and subsidiary corporations conform to the realities of the situation before the
court. Subordination is a means of regulating distribution results in reorganiza-
tion by adjusting the respective order of claimants and stockholders to the
equitable levels of their comparative claim positions in the proceeding. Its fun-
damental aim is to undo or offset any inequity in the position of a creditor or
stockholder which will produce injustice or unfairness to the other creditors or
stockholders in terms of reorganization results.
6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.15, at 259-61 (14th ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
The powers of equitable subordination may not be exercised indiscriminately, how-
ever; certain "operative facts" must exist before any equitable principle may be used to
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defeat an otherwise valid claim. In re Four Seasons Nursing Centers of America, Inc.,
483 F.2d 599, 602 (10th Cir. 1973).
What, then, are the circumstances or facts in a given situation that will warrant the
equitable subordination of a claim against a bankrupt? The most common uses of sub-
ordination, other than in the cases of consensual subordination, occur when:
(1) A creditor has committed fraud in his dealings with the bankrupt; or
(2) A creditor has been unjustly enriched by virtue of his fiduciary relationship
with the bankrupt; or
(3) There has been undue influence by a shareholder or officer on a corporate
debtor, or improper dealings between parent and subsidiary corporations.
Obviously, the distinctions among these categories are not always drawn clearly,
and often a claim will be subordinated as a result of a combination of these factors.
Reported case law, however, does not appear to substantiate a claim for subordination
under any of these three categories with respect to the claim of a lender, acting in good
faith, that attempts to enforce a guaranty given by an affiliate or subsidiary of the
borrower. Specifically, no precedent exists for finding either fraud or a fiduciary duty
on the part of the lender. Furthermore, no cases indicate that a lender has acted un-
fairly or inequitably in taking a guaranty. The third category-undue influence upon a
debtor by its parent or shareholders-has, interestingly, been judicially reviewed with
respect to third-party lenders and is worthy of further discussion.
The idea of subordinating the claim of a parent corporation against a subsidiary
corporation when a parent has used its position in a self-serving manner to the detri-
ment of the subsidiary's creditors was first enunciated in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec.
Co., supra, a reorganization proceeding involving a debtor corporation completely con-
trolled through common stock ownership by its parent. The court, after examining the
evidence, determined that the unsecured claim of the parent as a creditor of the debtor
must be subordinated to the claims of the debtor's preferred shareholders because of
the parent's disastrous management of the subsidiary and the self-serving dealings of
the parent with the subsidiary. This doctrine, which has come to be known as the "Deep
Rock" doctrine (named after the debtor-subsidiary in Taylor), has been followed in
many cases.
It is important to note, however, that the control of a subsidiary does not in itself
require subordination of all claims of the parent against the subsidiary. As the court
noted in International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957):
Mere domination of a subsidiary corporation by a parent does not require
the subordination of claims by the parent where the subsidiary is properly fi-
nanced and managed.... Where the subsidiary, however, is controlled by the
parent for its own purposes and without regard to the interest of the sub-
sidiary, the claims of the parent should be subordinated, and this without
proof of fraud or illegality.
Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
Taylor involved a technical parent-subsidiary relationship. The possibility of extend-
ing the Taylor doctrine was discussed in Moulded Prods., Inc. v. Barry, 474 F.2d 220
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973), but rejected:
This case is not a proper one for the exercise of the power to subordinate or
for an extension of the "Deep Rock" doctrine. In Taylor, the subsidiary was
completely controlled by the parent, and the disastrous management decisions
came from the parent. Here, the two products which caused Moulded
Products' downfall were conceived and undertaken by the management of
Moulded Products, which then approached Monsanto for financial backing. Al-
though Monsanto did give financial backing to the project and encouraged
Moulded Products to proceed, the evidence does not establish that it was
primarily responsible for the financial disaster which occurred. On the con-
trary, the record reveals that Monsanto, in an effort to avoid anti-trust prob-
lems, refrained from involving itself in the management of Moulded Products.
Id. at 223.
It seems clear from this opinion that where a lender is not controlling or managing
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Article analyzes the application of fraudulent conveyance law to
these intercorporate guaranty agreements.
When the principal stockholder of a corporation guaranties
repayment of its obligations, and collateralizes the obligation
represented thereby by a security interest in the stockholder's as-
sets, such a commitment by the principal protects the integrity
and value of the principal's investment. The legal adequacy of
the consideration cannot in such a case be seriously questioned,
because protection of the value of the assets helps to assure
repayment of the principal's direct creditors. Accordingly, no
question of constructive or actual fraud on such creditors can be
raised without additional allegations, and the obligation on the
guaranty will be fully enforceable pari passu with the claims of
direct creditors whether the "downstream" guarantor is an indi-
vidual or a corporation. Legal difficulties must be faced, how-
ever, in the context of the guaranty by a subsidiary of the obliga-
tions of its parent (the "upstream" guaranty)3 or the guaranty by
one corporation of the obligations of its affiliate (the "cross-
stream" guaranty).4 In such a case, the consideration passing to
the guarantying entity is not immediate and direct, but at best
the affairs of a debtor, even if such lender acquires stock of the debtor, its claims may
not be subordinated under the "Deep Rock" doctrine. Conversely, however, when a
lender apparently has been involved actively in the management of the debtor and that
management has been self-serving and disastrous to the debtor, the court will appar-
ently find some form of fiduciary duty on the part of the lender, and its claim will be
subordinated. See In re Process-Manz, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 348-49 (N.D. Ill. 1964),
rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
Research reveals no reported cases in which a lender that has advanced money to
the parent of a debtor and has taken the guaranty of the debtor has been deemed to be
in control of the debtor for purposes of subordination under the "Deep Rock" doctrine.
Arguably, Moulded Products precludes subordination under the "Deep Rock" doctrine in
the guaranty situation.
' Typical circumstances in which a lender will require "upstream" guaranties are
those in which its lending relationship is with a holding company and the bulk of the
assets upon which the lender bases its credit judgment are distributed among the hold-
ing company's subsidiaries. In order to be in a position in which it reasonably can
anticipate repayment out of the liquidation of those assets, the lender will require the
subsidiaries to guaranty the obligation of the holding company and will frequently re-
quire that the guaranty of each subsidiary be secured by a security interest in its assets.
If practical, the lender can be expected also to require the holding company to pledge
the stock of the subsidiaries to it to secure the loan. The pledge of stock is not generally
afforded great weight in the lender's credit determination because the subsidiaries' gen-
eral creditors would still have priority over the lender in the subsidiaries' assets in a
bankruptcy situation. A pledge of stock coupled with the "upstream" guaranties and
collateral security, however, often gives the lender greater comfort.
4 The "cross-stream" guaranty is indicated in the case in which two or more corpo-
rations are wholly owned by the same principals, particularly where they are involved in
related activities and share a common destiny. Thus, for example, when one entity owns
the land and plant from which the operations of another are conducted and both are
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subsequent (if some of the loaned funds eventually find their
way to the guarantying corporation) and indirect (the guaranty-
ing entity may benefit from the strengthened financial position
of the group as a whole). In this context, the question whether
such subsequent and indirect consideration is legally sufficient to
justify the lender's pari passu claim with general creditors to the
assets of the guarantor, particularly with those general creditors
who extended credit prior to the guaranty, is directly raised. The
problem is exacerbated, of course, when the guaranty is col-
lateralized by a security interest in all or some of the guarantor's
assets, because the lender is then placed ahead of, rather than on
a par with, prior, direct, unsecured creditors.
Despite a body of case law that has been developing since
the enactment of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth in 1570, 5 few, if
any, cases deal squarely with the problem.6 This may be because
such cases would tend to arise in a bankruptcy context, and
decisions of bankruptcy judges are not officially reported and
are generally unavailable; 7 or because there is an institutional
preference for settling rather than risking unfavorable case law;
or because lawyers and judges simply have overlooked the issues.
Moreover, this dearth of case law is not the only obstacle to
reaching a clear conclusion. Although all states have inherited
the Statute of 13 Elizabeth as part of their common law, only
twenty-four states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
owned by the same person or persons, a cautious lender will require that the nonbor-
rowing affiliate guaranty the obligation of the borrowing entity and, perhaps, col-
lateralize the guaranty with a security interest in, or lien on, the assets of the guarantor.
5 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1570). For an interesting discussion of the evolution of the law of
fraudulent conveyances, see 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
§§ 58-62b (rev. ed. 1940).
6 The only case found that involves the "upstream" guaranty problem is Zellerback
Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d 550 (1970). The court
found that the mortgage given to secure both the indebtedness of the corporation and
the corporation's guaranty of its sole stockholder's indebtedness constituted a fraudu-
lent conveyance for lack of fair consideration. In comparing the value of the mortgage
to the amount of the indebtedness, however, the court simply ignored the guaranty of
the stockholder indebtedness: "The corporation's only 'antecedent debt' to the bank was
the $11,000. The $47,500 personal debt of [the shareholder] is not to be considered in
deciding whether West-Coast received fair consideration. The $47,500 [shareholder]
debt is neither a 'present advance' nor an 'antecedent debt' of West-Coast." Id. at 435,
477 P.2d at 554. Interestingly, therefore, the court focused only on the mortgage and
ignored the guaranty, without ever directly confronting the question whether the
guaranty, as opposed to the mortgage, could withstand attack as a fraudulent con-
veyance.
7 Decisions are selectively and unofficially reported in CCH Bankruptcy Law Reports
(Commerce Clearing House) and Bankruptcy Court Decisions Reporter (Corporate Reor-
ganization Reporter, Inc.).
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veyance Act (UFCA) first promulgated in 1918.8 Thus, to the
extent it is relevant, the nonconforming law of any number of
other states must be consulted. Furthermore, the UFCA, a
sparse, twelve-section statute, itself provides for the retention of
prior law for the many situations that it does not cover.9 Finally,
to complicate matters further, Congress adopted a slightly dif-
ferent version of the UFCA for incorporation into the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.10 The Bankruptcy Act, however, also subro-
gates the trustee to the rights of an existing creditor with stand-
ing to set aside a fraudulent conveyance under state law;" the
trustee, therefore, typically will have his choice of proceeding
under federal or state law.
With the preceding complications in mind, this analysis will
focus on the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act. The most fre-
quently invoked substantive provisions of the fraudulent con-
veyance statute, in both the UFCA and Bankruptcy Act versions,
will be analyzed for their effect upon intercorporate guaranties.
Special attention will be paid to the definitions provided in the
two statutes. The examination will then turn to the operation of
a saving clause that may be available to the lender once a
fraudulent conveyance is proved. Finally, some limited solutions
for minimizing the probability of attack will be suggested.
II. CONVEYANCES AND OBLIGATIONS
WITHOUT FAIR CONSIDERATION THAT
RENDER THE GUARANTOR INSOLVENT
The first and most important substantive provision of the
UFCA states: "Every conveyance made and every obligation in-
8 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, in 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (master ed.
supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as UFCA].
The UFCA has been adopted in the following jurisdictions: Ariz. (1919); Cal.
(1939); Del. (1919); Idaho (1969); Md. (1920); Mass. (1924); Mich. (1919); Minn.
(1921); Mont. (1945); Nev. (1931); N.H. (1919); N.J. (1919); N.M. (1959); N.Y. (1925);
N.D. (1943); Ohio (1961); Okla. (1965); Pa. (1921); S.C. (1919); Tenn. (1919); Utah
(1925); V.I. (1957); Wash. (1945); Wis. (1919); Wyo. (1929). 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 269
(master ed. supp. 1976).
1 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 11.
"0Bankruptcy Act § 67d, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 107(d) (1970).
11 Bankruptcy Act § 70e(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1 10(e)(1) (1970). Even assuming identical
substantive law, proceeding under § 70e rather than § 67d gives the trustee the benefit
of both the state statute of limitations, rather than the one-year limitation in § 67d, and
the clear application of the principle of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). Under this
principle, the trustee may avoid a transaction in toto for the benefit of the estate even
though the creditor to whose rights he is subrogated may have been able to avoid the
transaction only in part had he exercised his state-created rights in his own behalf. No
case considers whether Moore is applicable to a § 67d cause of action, although consis-
tency of result would compel an affirmative response.
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curred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent
is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if
the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a
fair consideration. 12 The Bankruptcy Act contains a similar
provision.13 Giving a guaranty is unquestionably an "obligation
incurred,"' 4 and granting a security interest in assets to col-
lateralize that guaranty is unquestionably a "conveyance" within
the meaning of the statutory provisions.' 5 The crucial inquiry,
then, concerns the meaning of "fair consideration" and "insol-
vency."
Because the reconstruction of a corporation's actual finan-
cial condition as of a prior specific relevant date presents obvi-
ously enormous difficulties to the trier of fact, decisions based on
the foregoing provision inevitably analyze first whether fair con-
sideration was given for the obligation incurred or property
transferred. Only in the absence of fair consideration does the
12 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 4.
13 (2) Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within
one year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act
by or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such
transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a
debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his
actual intent;...
Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1970).
14 Thomason v. Crane, 73 F. 327 (C.C.D. Nev. 1896); Cating Rope Works, Inc. v.
Johnson, 22 Misc. 2d 284, 200 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. 1960); see Zellerback Paper Co.
v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d 550 (1970); Roxbury State Bank v.
The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324 A.2d 24, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 316, 331 A.2d
16 (1974); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States Trust Co., 236 App. Div. 500, 260 N.Y.S.
40 (1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 557, 188 N.E. 63 (1933); Everdell & Longstreth, Some Special
Problems Raised by Debt Financing of Corporations Under Common Control, 17 Bus. LAw. 500
(1962).
15 "'Conveyance' includes . . . the creation of any lien or incumbrance." UFCA,
supra note 8, at § 1; see Zellerback Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431,
477 P.2d 550 (1970); Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324
A.2d 24, cert. denied, 66 N.J. 316, 331 A.2d 16 (1974).
The Bankruptcy Act departs from the language of the UFCA by utilizing the word
"transfer" in place of "conveyance." Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)
(1970). Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act defines "transfer" as follows:
(30) "Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an in-
terest therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or
upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntar-
ily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, pay-
ment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise; the retention
of a security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer
suffered by such a debtor ....
Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970) (emphasis supplied); see Corn Exch.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943); United Towing Co. v. Phillips,
242 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 861 (1957); In re Farm & Home Co., 84
F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1936).
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trier of fact proceed to a consideration of the financial situation
of the transferor on the relevant date.
A. Fair Consideration
The UFCA contains the following definition:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obliga-
tion,
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obliga-
tion, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith,
property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied,
or
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in
good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent
debt in amount not disproportionately small as com-
pared with the value of the property, or obligation
obtained.1
6
The Bankruptcy Act version of the UFCA contains a substan-
tively identical definition, although it is presented in a somewhat
different order.17 The provision contains separate measures of
fair consideration for two different types of transfer: the first
part covers outright transfers and assumptions of obligations,
while the second part refers to transfers for security. When an
outright transfer or assumption of an obligation occurs, the
transferor must receive "a fair equivalent" for there to be fair
consideration. When, however, the property is given as security,
the advance to the transferor or the transferor's antecedent debt
need only be "not disproportionately small" as compared to the
value of the property transferred.' 8 The different language
seems to allow considerably more leeway, in terms of discrepancy
of value, in the security transfer than in the outright transfer
context. In the context of the issue at hand, this means that, if
sufficient consideration is found to support the guaranty, it
16 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 3.
17 d(1). For the purposes of, and exclusively applicable to, this subdivision d
. (e) consideration given for the property or obligation of a debtor is "fair"
(1) when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property
is transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (2) when such property or
obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent
debt in an amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of
the property or obligation obtained.
Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1970).
1" The distinction is simply an acknowledgment of commercial practice. See, e.g.,
Epstein v. Goldstein, 107 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1939); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.33
(14th ed. 1975).
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should be relatively easy to insulate the security interest from
attack for lack of fair consideration by limiting the collateral
taken to an amount that is only in "reasonable" excess of the
value of the guarantied obligation.
1. Consideration for the Guaranty
Thus, the threshold question is whether consideration
passing to a third party guarantor is sufficient under the above
definition to support an "upstream" or "cross-stream" guaranty.
A simple hypothetical will be useful. Suppose that P wishes to
borrow money from Bank, but Bank requires that the loan be
guarantied by S, an insolvent subsidiary of P, and that the
guaranty be collateralized by either a security interest in, or
hypothecation of, the assets of S. Does S under these circum-
stances receive "fair consideration" in exchange for its guaranty
and lien or hypothecation?
One line of cases supports the proposition that while the
agreement of a creditor to extend a debtor's time for payments,
or to forbear suing on the claim, constitutes a "valuable" consid-
eration for the promise of a third party to pay a debt, such
"valuable" consideration is not synonymous with "fair" consider-
ation under the statute. 19 Such cases interpret the language of
the definition literally. Either property must be conveyed to the
transferor or an antecedent debt of the transferor must be satis-
fied for there to be fair consideration. Such a literal reading
requires receipt of a balance sheet asset or cancellation of a
balance sheet liability to qualify as fair consideration. Under this
interpretation, probably no guaranty, except perhaps a "down-
stream" guaranty, in the situation described could be given for
fair consideration. Therefore, any guaranty could withstand at-
tack only to the extent that the guarantor was solvent at the
point that the obligation of guaranty was incurred.
The narrow definition of fair consideration discussed above
may be brittle and may not accord with financial realities. In the
context of a group of closely held corporations, some courts have
shown a willingness to ignore the technical separateness of the
entities in deciding whether fair consideration has been received,
particularly in the situation in which recovery is sought from a
19 Davis v. Hudson Trust Co., 28 F.2d 740, 742-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S.
655 (1928); see In re B-F Bldg. Corp., 312 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1963); Edward Hines W.
Pine Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 61 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1932); Bennett v. Rodman & En-
glish, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 62 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1932).
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transferee who originally supplied the funds-a lender.2 0 Such
an approach, however, has been based upon a finding that even
though the loan or property given went to a specific entity, all of
the legally separable, but factually inseparable, parts of the entity
benefited thereby.2' This approach, then, has not advanced
beyond the inadequate general rule, and, ironically, the lender's
position may vary inversely with the degree to which the borrow-
ing entities observe the legal niceties of separation of opera-
tions.22 It may be questioned whether such a result leads to sound
20 See, e.g., Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960). The court was careful to point out, however, that "usually a
diversion of corporate assets for the benefit of a third person . . . is a transfer without
'fair consideration.' "Id. at 829 (footnote omitted).
21 The Sixth Circuit in Mayo gave the following explanation for its finding of fair
consideration:
There was such a degree of identity and commingling of affairs between
Twin City and Gray that the corporation and its sole stockholder cannot be
regarded as separate legal entities, insofar as the $50,000 loan is concei'ned.
Gray was the sole stockholder. The corporate resolutions authorized Gray to
act for Twin City in whatever way he saw fit, and authorized the Bank to
honor Twin City checks drawn by Gray to pay personal debts. The loan was
made on Gray's credit, but the proceeds inured immediately to Twin City's
credit and the ostensible purpose of the loan, as stated to the bank, was to
enable Gray to do business as Twin City Construction Company instead of
W.A. Gray Construction Company. The hidden purpose was to enable Gray to
obtain a performance bond in the name of Twin City that Twin City was not
entitled to on the state of its finances and that Gray could not obtain on the
state of his finances. After this object was accomplished, and before Twin City
could even begin a separate existence, Twin City, through Gray, paid back the
identical money lent to Gray and deposited in the corporate account only
twelve days before. From the beginning to the end of the transaction Gray as
Gray, or Gray as Twin City, made no effort to separate himself from his
corporation-so far as the bank is concerned. To the extent that Gray is sepa-
rable from Twin City, the loan was for the benefit of Twin City; if the loan
was for the benefit of Gray, the bank had no alternative, under the language
of the resolutions, to honoring Gray's signature and instructions.
It is one thing to observe the corporate fiction as if the fiction were the
truth-when the fiction is not abused. It is quite a different thing when the
sole stockholder either ignores the corporation as a separate entity or uses the
corporate fiction as an instrument of deceit. Here, the corporation and the
individual owner were two sides of a single false coin.
The requirement of "fair consideration" is aimed at preventing a bankrupt
depleting his estate just preceding his bankruptcy either by improvidence or by
action intended to defeat creditors or favor friends. As we read the statute in
the light of its purpose, we think that the voidable transfer provisions were
never intended to apply to this case.
Id. at 830.
2 As an illustration, in an integrated multisubsidiary corporate structure, the dom-
inant parent corporation may funnel its product through a myriad of different entities
in the distribution chain. Different products ultimately may be marketed by any
number of legally distinct subsidiaries or subsidiaries of subsidiaries, all wholly owned,
under different brand names. In fact, production and financial planning occurs only at
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lending practices or strikes an appropriate balance among the
various claimants to the estate of the borrower and guarantor,
for it tends to recognize financial reality only when it is high-
lighted through legal laxity.
Several other courts have better rationalized upholding var-
ious transfers against fraudulent conveyance challenges by find-
ing that sufficient consideration passed to the transferor because
an opportunity had been given to it to escape bankruptcy
through the strengthening of an affiliated corporation that re-
ceived the benefit of the transfer.23 Such an approach seems
indisputably proper when a weak but still solvent entity is ren-
dered insolvent only because of the inclusion of the guaranty on
the liability side of the balance sheet.24 This permits the analysis
to focus upon economic reality in the appropriate factual context
without rewarding legal laxity or inflexibly ignoring real benefits
merely because they have no place on the company's balance
sheet.25
the very top level of the structure. All entities operate under the direct control of com-
mon management, which retains responsibility for all decisionmaking and even,
perhaps, for day-to-day operations. Financial institutions, understandably, are inclined
to look at the group as a whole with different divisions, inextricably linked together.
23 In Williams v. Twin City Company, 251 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1958), the bankrupt
purchased a supply of lumber from the defendant on credit and, to secure its obliga-
tion, transferred certain warehouse receipts to defendant. Eventually, the bankrupt de-
faulted and a refinancing agreement involving a third party was reached. The bankrupt
transferred all of his inventory and accounts receivable to a trustee for the benefit of
the third party who guarantied a promissory note of the bankrupt payable to the de-
fendant. The defendant transferred the warehouse receipts to the third-party guaran-
tor but retained a security interest in them to secure the guaranty of the bankrupt's
note. Ultimately, the trustee sought to set aside, as a fraudulent conveyance, the trans-
fer of assets to the trust. The Ninth Circuit denied the trustee's claim:
Consideration for the execution of the note by Elliff (the bankrupt] was
the release to Mrs. Lannin [the third party] by the defendants of the
warehouse receipts. The direct consideration did not run from the creditors to
Elliff, but it is not essential that it do so. Consideration can run to a third
party, so long as it is given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced.
This was done here. There was indirect benefit to Elliff by giving him a
further chance to avoid bankruptcy-further time. 11 U.S.C.A. § 107, sub.
d(l)(e), in defining fair consideration, merely requires a transfer, not a transfer
to the debtor. We agree with the trial court that there was consideration.
Id. at 681. Williams is even more noteworthy because the court held that an indirect
benefit may constitute fair consideration; note, however, that the transferor-bankrupt
was the original debtor. In McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1968),
modified, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1969), the postponement of bankruptcy, an indirect ben-
efit arising out of the transfer sought to be set aside, was held to constitute fair consid-
eration. But see Zellerback Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d
550 (1970), discussed in note 6supra.
24 For a discussion of the balance sheet effects of a guaranty, see text accompanying
note 50 infra.
25 The same analysis presumably would apply to the conveyance of a security in-
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Such an approach would lead to a finding of fair considera-
tion for a guaranty in a variety of other appropriate contexts. If
an alter ego situation presents sufficient consideration, then so
should the guaranty of a loan to a third party that is not the alter
ego of the guarantor but whose continued health and existence
is vitally important to the guarantor-a vital supplier or cus-
tomer, for example. Under this approach, fair consideration to
the guarantor could be found without much difficulty when the
loan to the affiliated corporation strengthens its operation suffi-
ciently so that the health of the guarantor is maintained or im-
proved, even though bankruptcy was not imminent. Unfortu-
nately, however, no reported cases have gone so far, and the line
of cases26 interpreting the definition in a harshly literal way can-
not be ignored.
2. Consideration for the Security Interest
Can fair consideration be found for giving a guaranty itself
but not for granting a security interest on the property of the
guarantor collateralizing the obligations? The test is that the loan
guaranties must not be "disproportionately small" as compared
to the property transferred.27 Thus, if the guaranty is given for
what is found to be fair consideration, and the guaranty repre-
sents a contingent obligation to pay, for example, $10,000, then
granting a security interest in machinery worth $10,000 is
necessarily for "fair consideration" within the meaning of the
statute.
Suppose, however, that the lender takes a blanket lien on all
of the assets of the guarantor that are found to have a value in
excess of $100,000. Because a sale of those assets for $10,000
would clearly not be for fair consideration, the question pre-
sented is whether granting a security interest2 8 in such property
has the same effect as a sale. Because the secured party (the
terest to secure an "upstream" guaranty or to a hypothecation of assets for the benefit
of the borrowing entity.
26 Cases cited note 19 supra.
27 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 3; Bankruptcy Act § 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970).
28 For the purpose of continuity, throughout this discussion all security devices are
referred to as "security interests." This will help to relate all such security devices to
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code by using the terminology adopted by the
Code. Generally speaking, however, the words "mortgage" or "lien" could be substi-
tuted wherever "security interest" appears. Thus, the use of Code terminology is not
intended to ignore the fact that the Code applies only to personal property. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102. The principles discussed herein apply equally to real prop-
erty mortgages.
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lender) would only be entitled, even upon repossession and sale
of all the assets, to an amount equal to the debt owed to it by the
debtor, it would seem logical that all that was transferred by way
of the mortgage was a $10,000 interest in the assets. Unfortu-
nately, this simple logic has not been adopted by the courts.
Some cases indicate that, in determining fair consideration when
a security interest is involved, the test of "disproportionate-
ly small" is made by comparing the amount of the loan with the
full value of the property that is subject to the security inter-
est.2 9 This result seems illogical but appears to be the law
nevertheless. 30 The possibility exists that the result might be
avoided if the security interest were limited specifically to the
amount of the debt, but no direct authority supports such a
conclusion.
Accordingly, despite the illogic of the result, the lender, in
taking a security interest from a guarantor, must limit that in-
terest to collateral not "disproportionately" in excess of the debt
that it is securing. Because satisfaction of an antecedent debt
may constitute valid consideration under these provisions, 31 a
subsequent adjustment of the relationship of collateral to in-
debtedness can be made if the value of the collateral declines
and the guarantor is either willing or contractually bound to do
so. Although this exercise would appear to be void of substance,
29 See Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 120 F.2d 254 (3d
Cir. 1941); In re Decker, 295 F. Supp. 501 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub. noma.
Woodson v. Gilmer, 420 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970). But see
Shay v. Gagne, 275 Mass. 386, 176 N.E. 200 (1931); Stark v. Flemington Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 38 N.J. Super. 58, 118 A.2d 114 (1955).
In Shay v. Gagne, supra, the court said:
Here the mortgage was received by the mortgagee as security against loss
from future contingent liabilities resulting from indorsements previously made
.... [S]uch liabilities were antecedent debts. They were not "disproportion-
ately small" in amount .... The mortgage, when given, was for an amount not
in excess of the mortgagee's future contingent liabilities on his indorsements
and, consequently, was not greater in amount than was necessary to secure fully the
mortgagee against such liabilities.
275 Mass. at 390-91, 176 N.E. at 201-02 (emphasis supplied). Note that the comparison
is between the obligation secured and the amount of the mortgage, rather than between
the obligation secured and the value of the mortgaged property. It would seem that the
comparison made in Shay is the proper one.
30 The only apparent logical reason would seem to be that the assets pledged to
secure the obligation are no longer freely marketable and, for example, cannot be used
as security should the debtor need additional financing. While this is certainly true of
some assets, such as accounts receivable, it is not necessarily the case with all. In the
case of real estate and other fixed assets, for example, second mortgage financing can
usually be found, albeit at higher interest rates.
31 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1970).
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because a secured creditor is never entitled to more of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of a security than the obligation secured plus
interest and costs, it may be necessary, nonetheless, in light of
the existing case law.
3. Good Faith
To this point, only half of the statutory requirements for
fair consideration have been dealt with. In addition to the re-
quirement that adequate value pass, the transfer must also be
made "in good faith. '32 This requirement is somewhat peculiar
because it adds a subjective element to what is otherwise an ob-
jective determination; it thus raises the question whether the
draftsmen of the UFCA were true to their announced goals. In
separating out certain of the "badges of fraud ' 33 that had de-
veloped under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth and were capable of
objective proof, and in making them irrebuttable presumptions
of fraud, the draftsmen intended to require, in all other cases,
proof, without the benefit of presumptions, of a subjective actual
intent to defraud. Here, however, a hybrid remains: proof of the
subjective lack of good faith, which is clearly something less than
intent to defraud, plus proof of the objective fact of insolvency,
equals voidability. What, then, does "good faith" mean?
The first question is whose good faith is relevant, the
lender's or the guarantor's? The definition of fair consideration
32Id.; Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1958); Inland Security Co. v.
Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
33 The Statute of 13 Elizabeth imposed criminal penalties upon transfers of prop-
erty that "are devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile, to the
end purpose and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and offers of their just and
lawful actions . . ." 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1570) (emphasis supplied). Predictably, intent was
inordinately difficult to prove, and, beginning with Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 806, 76
Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1607), the courts began to enunciate "badges of
fraud"-fact patterns that would give rise to presumptions of intent to defraud. Liter-
ally dozens of "badges" were developed over the centuries. The draftsmen of the
UFCA, in their prefatory note, cited as one of three conditions primarily responsible
for the confusions and inconsistencies of the existing law the "attempt to make the
Statute of Elizabeth cover all conveyances which wrong creditors, even though the ac-
tual intent to defraud does not exist." 7 UNIFORMi LAWS ANN. 424 (master ed. 1970).
From that premise, the draftsmen attempted to sanction a few of the badges and
eliminate the rest:
In the Act as drafted all possibility of a presumption of law as to intent is
avoided. Certain conveyances which the courts have in practice condemned,
such as a gift by an insolvent, are declared fraudulent irrespective of intent.
On the other hand, while all conveyances with intent to defraud creditors (see
Section 7) are declared fraudulent, it is expressly stated that the intent must be
"actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed as a matter of law."
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is drafted in terms of what is given by the transferee (the lender)
in exchange for the property of the transferor, and, accordingly,
it would seem that it is the good faith of the transferee that is
relevant. The conclusion is well supported by the available judi-
cial construction.
34
One test frequently employed to determine what constitutes
"good faith" on the part of the lender is whether the transaction
"carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. 35 The phras-
ing of this test in terms of the arm's length quality of the bargain
indicates a primary concern with "insider" conduct. Thus, as
would be expected, the cases that enunciate this standard tend to
involve insiders of the transferee.36 Courts seem to strain to find
a lack of good faith in this context. 37 The implications of these
31 See, e.g., Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1958); Inland Security Co.
v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974); De Aragon v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 322 F. Supp. 1006 (D.P.R. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 263 (Ist Cir. 1972). The
leading treatise on bankruptcy is in accord:
"Grammatically considered, at least, the definition seems to indicate that the good
faith of the transferee is all that matters." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.33, at 506
n.5 (14th ed. 1975).
35 Holahan v. Henderson, 277 F. Supp. 890, 898-99 (W.D. La. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 394 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968); accord, Bullard v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1972); Inland Security Co. v.
Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 350 (W.D. Mo. 1974); cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 305-07 (1939) ("arm's length" test applied in an equitable subordination con-
text).
36 E.g., Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972); Inland
Security Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
37 In Inland Security Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974),
Kirshner filled the respective roles of president, director, controlling shareholder and a
"client" of the bankrupt. In return for a service fee, the bankrupt serviced its clients by
collecting monies due on securities owned by the clients and disbursing the funds to the
clients periodically. Funds collected for Kirshner's account were put into the bankrupt's
general operating account and were consumed in the business of the bankrupt, not
paid out to him. About eight months prior to filing a petition in bankruptcy, Kirshner
transferred to himself, as a partial payment of the amount owed him, a secured promis-
sory note issued by a local church.
Observing that the bankrupt was in precarious financial condition at the time of
the transfer-a fact of which Kirshner was well aware-the court found a lack of good
faith in the transaction:
A review of the record shows that Mr. Kirshner was the President, Direc-
tor, managing officer and controlling stockholder of the bankrupt. Although
he was formally referred to as a "client," it is apparent that Mr. Kirshner was
the alter-ego of the bankrupt. The affairs and management of the bankrupt
were dominated by Mr. Kirshner. The unsecured open account which was
credited periodically by the bankrupt in favor of Mr. Kirshner was essentially a
" . . corporate pocket of the dominant stockholder, who, with disregard of the
substance or form of corporate management, has treated its affairs as his own."
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 309, 60 S.Ct. 238, 246, 84 L.Ed. 281, 291
(1939); Duberstein v. Werner, 256 F. Supp. 515, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). Mr.
Kirshner was the alter-ego of the bankrupt. See, Holahan v. Henderson, 277
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cases should not be troublesome in the context of the establish-
ment of new lending relationships, but may become important in
the context of continuing relationships, and particularly in
F.2d 890, 898 (W.D. La. 1967), affirmed, 394 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1968).
Under these circumstances, the transaction of February 28, 1971, and Mr.
Kirshner's dealings with the bankrupt must be subjected to "rigorous scrutiny."
With respect to the challenged transaction ". . . the burden is on the director
or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to
show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those
interested therein." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245, 84
L.Ed. 281, 289 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590,
599, 41 S.Ct. 209, 65 L.Ed. 425, 432 (1921). "The essence of the test is
whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the ear-
marks of an arm's length bargain." Pepper v. Litton, supra; accord, Bullard v.
Aluminum Company of America, supra; Holahan v. Henderson, supra.
Furthermore, because of his position as President, Director, managing of-
ficer and controlling stockholder of the bankrupt, Mr. Kirshner's actions with
respect to the transaction of February 28, 1971, must be viewed in light of his
fiduciary relationship to the bankrupt.... [T]he fiduciary relationship between
Mr. Kirshner and the bankrupt, stockholders and creditors of the bankrupt
had to be one of trust and confidence. This relationship imposed upon Mr.
Kirshner the burden and duty of acting with utmost good faith in the best
interests of the bankrupt, stockholders and creditors of the bankrupt, and re-
quired him to refrain from exploiting his position while in a strategic position
of the highest trust, for his own personal profit and to the detriment of the
bankrupt, stockholders, or creditors of the bankrupt.
Id. at 348-49.
In Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972), the trans-
feror validly owed to the transferee a debt that was guarantied by the holder of 15% of
the stock of the transferor. Thereafter, the transferor paid the defendant approxi-
mately one-half of the antecedent debt in full and final satisfaction thereof, and the
defendant released the guarantor from its judgment. On the date of the settlement
agreement, the transferor was insolvent. The court, emphasizing the relationship of the
parties involved, found the transaction fraudulent:
Considering all the facts that attended this transaction we agree with the
district court that the transfer was fraudulent within the meaning of
§ 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. We find most significant the relationship
of the parties to the settlement agreement and the respective allocation of its
benefits. Henry Kritzer, the President of the bankrupt as well as a director and
stockholder of Bastian Morely, was released entirely and without any consider-
ation on his part from a legally enforceable state court judgment against him.
Moreover, Bastian Morely, the principal stockholder of the bankrupt, was
permitted to retain its supplier and, for a consideration, extinguished its own
antecedent debt to Alcoa. Finally, Alcoa acquired an advantage over the other
creditors of the bankrupt at a time when Alcoa was certainly aware of the
precarious financial position of Kritzer Radiant.
Id. at 13-14. The court in this analysis completely ignored that the bankrupt was equally
liable upon the obligation as the guarantor and that, had the guarantor satisfied the ob-
ligation, he would have had a cause of action against the bankrupt corporation. If this
result were to be taken literally, the holder of an antecedent debt could never be certain
that he would be acting appropriately in accepting payment thereon, particularly if a
third-party guarantor exists. Such a result, it is submitted, is contrary to commercial
sense and is clearly erroneous.
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work-out situations.38 When a borrower is free to reject a
lender's terms and to seek credit elsewhere, no problem of good
faith in this context is involved. When, however, the lender is
represented on the borrower's board of directors and thereby
has a substantial influence on corporate policy, and, more im-
portantly, when the lender is in a position to call a default if, for
example, a guaranty and collateral for that guaranty are not
forthcoming from the borrower's subsidiary, the "arm's length"
standard may be applicable, and the lender is well advised to
proceed with due caution.
3 9
Another standard of good faith that has been applied by
some courts is whether the transferee knew or strongly sus-
pected that the transferor was insolvent. 40 It may be questioned
whether this standard comports with the draftsmen's intent in
isolating this badge of fraud for objective treatment. The cause
of action seems to require proof of two separate elements-lack
of fair consideration, and insolvency-neither one of which is
alone sufficient to establish a fraudulent conveyance without
proof of actual intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.
Under the statute, absent such proof, a transfer by an insolvent
company for fair consideration is valid, and a transfer without
fair consideration by a solvent company is unchallengeable.
When fair consideration is defined in terms of insolvency, how-
ever, the two elements become inseparable, with the result that a
transfer by an insolvent corporation for objectively good consid-
eration is voidable if the transferee knew or had reason to know
of the insolvency. That, it is submitted, was not the intended
meaning of the provision, and it harms the statutory scheme.41
The implications of these cases in the current context, how-
" See, e.g., In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
19 See generally Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interfer-
ence with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975).
40 Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1958), In re Southern Land Tide
Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1973). But see
Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 482, 486 (E.D. Ark. 1955), aff'd per
curiam, 369 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1966).
Other courts have required, as a prerequisite to a finding of bad faith, that the
transferee have knowledge that the transferor's purpose in effecting the transaction was
to defeat the claims of the transferor's other creditors. Gilmer v. Woodson, 332 F.2d
541, 546-47 (4th Cir. 1964) (good faith in valuing the property exchanged was also
required); In re Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1940). This test obviously
requires much more than a suspicion of insolvency and, when applied, should provide
little threat to the transaction.41 See note 33 supra.
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ever, are clear: a lending institution may be held to a standard
that will not permit it to ignore the financial condition of the
other contracting parties. Therefore, a guaranty and a lien on
the assets securing the guaranty of a subsidiary or affiliate of a
borrower may be voidable if the guarantor was insolvent on the
date of the transaction or is rendered insolvent thereby, and if,
should bankruptcy intervene, a present creditor of the guarantor
remained unpaid on the date of bankruptcy. This conclusion
could not possibly be drawn from reading the statute itself and
could lead to manifestly unfair results where a lender is using its
best efforts to attempt to rehabilitate a failing business and pro-
tect itself at the same time. Nevertheless, the implication cannot
be ignored, and the lender would be well advised to proceed
with the utmost caution in a situation approaching insolvency,
even when everyone's ostensible purpose is to perform a rescue
operation.
B. Insolvency
It must be concluded that, in the framework of institutional
lending, the financial condition of the guarantor may become
the central consideration. It enters into both elements of proof
for the avoidance of a guaranty and/or security interest in the
context of the provision being examined. The relevant inquiry,
then, is how, and as of what date, the financial condition of the
guarantor is determined.
1. The Date on Which Insolvency Is Determined
The relevant date for the determination of insolvency is
undoubtedly the date of transfer-the date on which the obliga-
tion is incurred or the date on which the lien is granted in the
assets. The Bankruptcy Act refines this concept slightly by defin-
ing when the transfer takes place:
For the purposes of this subdivision (d), a transfer
shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it
became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser
from the debtor could thereafter have acquired any
rights in the property so transferred superior to the
rights of the transferee therein, but, if such transfer is
not so perfected prior to the filing of the petition initiat-
ing a proceeding under this Act, it shall be deemed to
have been made immediately before the filing of such
petition.42
42 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(5), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(5) (1970).
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Thus, under the Bankruptcy Act version of the UFCA, a trans-
fer represented by an unperfected security interest in personal
property or unrecorded mortgage on real property will be
deemed to have taken place on the date of bankruptcy43-- when
the transferor most probably was clearly insolvent 44-- rather than
on the date upon which the security interest was granted-the
date probably relevant under state law where the concept of
transfer has not been refined. Accordingly, the date for test-
ing insolvency under the Bankruptcy Act may be months, or
even years, later than the relevant date under state law.45 This
discussion, however, will assume a sophisticated and diligent
lender which immediately perfects its rights under state law and
thereby cuts off any intervening rights of a potential bona fide
purchaser. On this basis, then, under either state law or federal
law pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act, the date on which the fi-
nancial condition of the guarantying entity must be recon-
structed is the date on which the obligation is incurred or the
lien is granted.
2. Insolvency Defined
The UFCA defines insolvency as follows: "A person is insol-
vent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than
the amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on
his existing debts as they become absolute and matured. '46 The
fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Act contain
their own definition of insolvency that supersedes the general
definition for the rest of that statute: "A person is 'insolvent'
when the present fair salable value of his property is less than
the amount required to pay his debts. 47 Insolvency is easier to
prove under this definition than under the general bankruptcy
definition,48 for the other definitions in the section and under
4 3 See Jackson Sound Studios, Inc. v. Travis, 473 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1973); Phillips
v. Wier, 328 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 269
F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959).
4' The reason for the qualification "most probably" is that there is no jurisdictional
requirement in the Bankruptcy Act that a voluntary bankrupt be insolvent before filing
a petition.
45 Some practitioners purport to avoid the uncertainties surrounding the relevant
date of transfer in the guaranty-plus-security-interest context by casting the transaction
in the mold of a hypothecation of property rather than a security interest. With a
hypothecation, property is unequivocably transferred (by granting permission to pledge
it) on a particular date to another party who pledges it to the lender, and no dispute as
to the relevant date of transfer can arise.
46 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 2(1).
47 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(d) (1970).
48 A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act
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the UFCA make it clear that exempt assets are excluded but
liabilities that are not provable in bankruptcy are included.
49
Thus, fewer assets and more liabilities are included than under
the general bankruptcy definition of insolvency.
What assets and liabilities are considered? With respect to
assets, only those nonexempt assets with a "present fair salable
value" are to be considered, and only to the extent of that
value.50 Before an asset is counted, it must have a market value,
whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he
may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be con-
cealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall
not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts ....
Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970).
49 For example, intentional tort claims or causes of action in negligence with respect
to which an action has not been commenced yet are not provable in bankruptcy and
therefore are not included as liabilities under the general definition of insolvency but
are included as liabilities in determining insolvency for fraudulent conveyance pur-
poses. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(14), 63a(7), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(14), 103(a)(7) (1970).
50 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(d) (1970). Although Collier
states that the term "present fair salable value," found in § 67d(1)(d), and "fair valua-
tion," found in § 1(19), are probably equivalent, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.32, at
498 (14th ed. 1975), there is authority that they are not synonymous. In In re Crystal
Ice & Fuel Co., 283 F. 1007 (D. Mont. 1922), all of the corporation's property was
subject to a trust deed securing a bond issue subject to foreclosure because of failure to
pay interest. On this evidence, the court found that the fair valuation exceeded debts
while the salable value did not exceed debts. The court said:
The record alone indicates that, though the debts exceeded the "salable
value" of the property, this was due to the character of the property and as a
going concern, to the trust deed, liens, seizure, neglect and the aggregation of
their embarrassing circumstances disabling the company from operation and
payment, rather than due to debts exceeding the fair valuation of the prop-
erty. Salable value and fair valuation are not synonymous, and the conclusion
"wholly insolvent" because of the fact that the "salable value" of the company's
property was less than its debts may be and is proven to be not at all the
insolvency of the Bankruptcy Act, viz. insufficiency of its property at fair valu-
ation to pay its debts.
"At times a debtor's property, though amply sufficient in value to dis-
charge all his obligations, may not be convertible without sacrifice into that
form by which payments may be made. This law regards that possibility. In
this there is indulgence to the debtor." Pierie v. Trust Co., supra; In re Butte
Duluth Mining Co., supra.
That is, although his property be not presendy salable for enough to pay
his debts, its fair valuation may be more than enough; and if so, he is not
insolvent nor subject to bankruptcy for insolvency.
Id. at 1009-10.
Although other cases do not clearly draw this distinction, it appears that while "fair
valuation" anticipates the possibility of liquidation within a reasonable time, "present
fair salable value" anticipates a more immediate liquidation. This has been suggested in
an article by Professor McLaughlin. McLaughlin, Application of the Uni orm Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REV. 404, 420 (1933). Professor McLaughlin's discussion of
insolvency is brief, but he notes that statements with respect to the concept of insol-
vency have been too loose to indicate any deliberation by the courts.
One Pennsylvania case arising under the UFCA held it to be error to find only
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measured by a willing seller and willing buyer, and it must be
subject to liquidation within a reasonably immediate period of
time.51 Thus, if an asset can be converted to cash only in the
future, it will not be included on the asset side. For an asset to be
salable, it must be of a nature to be transferable in a market
place for which a market can be deemed to exist. Thus, assets
that commonly appear on balance sheets, such as leasehold im-
provements, accrued expenses, and good will, must usually be
eliminated from the consideration of insolvency, and all tangible
salable assets must be valued at current market value rather than
at cost. For example, in the prevalent mid-1970's real estate
market, it is highly questionable whether a large and expensive
piece of commercial real estate could be included in the compu-
tation at a value approaching its "real" value, inasmuch as it is
most unlikely that a willing buyer could be found within a time
period approaching immediacy. On the other hand, certain
non-balance-sheet assets, such as patents, might qualify under
this test and should be included. 2
"fair salable value" instead of "present fair salable value." Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union
Natl Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 169 A. 209, cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1933).
Fidelity Trust involved shares of stock and did not allow for a period of time to market
the shares in order to get the best price. The court stated that valuation of the stock
should be based on a single immediate sale.
" The requirement that the asset be available to pay debts within a reasonable time
has arisen in controversy most often with regard to pending claims as assets. In In re
Cooper, 12 F.2d 485 (D. Mass. 1926), evidence as to the value of a suit for a breach of
contract instituted after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings was ex-
cluded. The basis for this ruling was that, because of the protracted nature of judicial
proceedings, funds from an eventual settlement would not be available within a reason-
able time. This does not mean, however, that a claim could never be an asset used for
determining insolvency. The court said, "The test seems to be whether the claim is one
which can be rendered available for the payment of debts within a reasonable time." Id.
at 486; see In re Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 545 (D. Minn. 1969)
(antitrust claim held not to be an asset for purposes of determining solvency).
Another reason for not including a legal claim probably has been its uncertainty in
character and amount, and thus its lack of appreciable value. See Penn v. Grant, 244
F.2d 309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957) (usury claim against finance com-
pany).
On the other hand, a court may include amounts that would have become available
to the company within a reasonable time. In Tumarkin v. Gallay, 127 F. Supp. 94
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), receipts received in advance on a contract were said to have value as
an asset because the contract upon which they were contingent was almost completed.
Under this requirement, it is clear that the property valuation need not be made at
once but may be deferred for a reasonable time. In Duncan v. Landis, 106 F. 839 (3d
Cir. 1901), one of the oldest cases in this area, the court, overruling an instruction to
the jury that required instant disposition and liquidation of the stock in question, stated:
"A man's property, at a fair valuation, may amount to sufficient to pay his debts, [sic]
although he might not be able to realize at once the amount of that valuation." Id. at 859.
52 Cf. Newsome Value Co. v. Crown Tire & Rubber Co., 279 F. 569 (8th Cir. 1922);
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With respect to liabilities, the definition clearly anticipates
inclusion of all debts, matured or unmatured, liquidated or un-
liquidated, fixed or contingent. Certainly, it would seem that on
the face of the statute no exception should be made to allow
exclusion of a guaranty on the liability side of the ledger. Con-
trary authority does exist, however. One court took the following
approach:
[T]he liability of a person as surety or indorser, if the
principal is solvent and abundantly able to pay, is not
such a liability as could be counted against him on the
question of his solvency or insolvency, because, if called
on to pay such debt, he would immediately have an
asset which would be equal to the amount he would be
required to pay.53
Of course, this problem is relevant only in the situation in
which, prior to incurring the guaranty, the guarantor is solvent
within the definition cited above. The question, then, is whether
the guarantor is "rendered insolvent" by contracting the
guaranty. The implication of the above quotation is that if, at the
time that the obligation is incurred, the principal obligor is sol-
vent and therefore is able to pay debts as they mature, then the
obligation is not included on the liability side of the guarantor's
balance sheet. To state the proposition in a different fashion, the
contingent liability represented by the guaranty would be in-
cluded, but it would be offset by a contingent asset represented
by the guarantor's right of subrogation against the primary
obligor if called upon to perform under the guaranty. Some
conceptual problems are presented in this approach. The notion
that the guaranty of a solvent obligor is offset by a contingent
asset based on the right of subrogation is simply not realistic;
when and if the guarantor is called upon to perform, the value
of that contingent asset in all likelihood would be discounted
severely because it probably would be no longer collectible.
Otherwise, the guarantor would not have been called upon to
perform. Thus, on the critical date for the determination of
solvency-the date on which the guaranty is given-it is nearly
impossible to justify a more than token value for the contingent
asset. An alternative approach would be first to evaluate all un-
Chicago Motor Vehicle Co. v. American Oak Leather Co., 141 F. 518, 522 (7th Cir.
1905).
5 3
In re Bowers, 215 F. 617, 618 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
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matured liabilities to determine the likelihood of their coming
due and then to discount them accordingly. This method, be-
sides doing violence to the statutory language, adds another
element of uncertainty to the determination of insolvency.
Thus, three methods of treating the guaranties for balance
sheet purposes remain: they may be included in full, under all
circumstances, as liabilities without offset; they may be left off
the balance sheet under all circumstances or included with off-
setting assets; or their inclusion and the extent thereof may be
made dependent on the likelihood that the liability will be in-
curred.
None of these results is particularly pleasing. Even more
disturbing, however, is the absence of any recent precedent in
the area and any precedent at all specifically relating to fraudu-
lent conveyances. Given this situation, the safest course is to add
the contingent liability represented by the guaranty to the liabil-
ity side of the balance sheet in all cases, and not to include any
contingent asset, represented by the rights of subrogation, on
the asset side. Unfortunately, this overcautious approach is likely
to result in an overly broad conception of insolvency that is out
of touch with economic reality. A more flexible approach based
on probabilities would be preferable.
In summary, the attorney for the lender whose positive
credit judgment requires a collateralized or noncollateralized
''cross-stream" or "upstream" corporate guaranty of the lending
transaction faces a morass of problems in determining the valid-
ity of the obligation under the statutory provisions: sparse, con-
fusing, and poorly written statutes; poorly rationalized and ar-
ticulated case law; a dearth of recent interpretive case law on
some central concepts; and a dearth of any case law at all on
others. Although some suggestions of limited usefulness are of-
fered at the conclusion of this Article, this section must end with
the pessimistic observation that, unless the guarantor is solvent
even after including the contingent liability represented by the
guaranty, the lender should be advised that it should not rely
upon the enforceability of such a guaranty or security interest in
the guarantor's assets for repayment of the obligation.
III. ACTUAL INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY,
OR DEFRAUD CREDITORS
The foregoing discussion involves a statutory provision
under which lack of fair consideration combined with insolvency
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gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption of an intent to defraud
creditors. The UFCA and the Federal Bankruptcy Act version of
the UFCA, in slightly different language, continue to render
voidable "every conveyance made and every obligation incurred
with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in
law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future
creditors. ' '54 Because actual intent must be proved without the
benefit of presumptions, it is generally very difficult to obtain
relief under this provision. There are certain advantages, how-
ever, to pursuing such a cause of action. Because a transaction
voidable under this section is fraudulent as against both present
and future creditors, 55 the trustee in bankruptcy can avoid the
transfer as long as a single general unsecured creditor exists at
the time of the bankruptcy, whether the credit transaction oc-
curred prior or subsequent to the voidable transfer. The pre-
viously discussed section is for the benefit only of present cred-
itors. 56 A pretransfer creditor with a provable claim therefore
must remain unpaid, or a trustee will not be able to set aside
such a transaction for the benefit of the estate.
As noted,5 7 one of the draftsmen's principal purposes in
drafting the UFCA was to abolish the "badges of fraud" that had
developed in the common law process as irrebuttable presump-
tions of actual intent to defraud. Under the UFCA, no such
irrebuttable presumptions should exist, other than those that
have been specifically legislated into the Act. Accordingly, prov-
ing a cause of action under the "actual intent to defraud" section
should receive the benefit of no presumption. Inasmuch as it is
impossible to look into the minds of the parties, however, infer-
ences must be permitted with respect to various facts and cir-
cumstances from which the requisite intent can be deduced.58
The question, then, becomes whether, in addition to the pre-
sumptively fraudulent situation discussed in the prior portion of
this Article, actual intent to defraud creditors can be found
properly in the legitimate collateralized lending transaction
under examination.
14 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 7; Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d)
(1970).
5 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 7.
56 See note 13 supra.
5 See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
5sSee, e.g., Battes v. United States, 172 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1949).
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The leading treatise on bankruptcy law summarizes the case
law as follows:
Circumstances from which courts have been willing to
infer fraud include concealment of facts and false pre-
tenses by the transferor, reservation by him of rights in
the transferred property, his absconding with or secret-
ing the proceeds of the transfer immediately after their
receipt, the existence of an unconscionable discrepancy be-
tween the value of property transferred and the consideration
received therefor, the fact that the transfer was made to
satisfy or secure a debt long since forgiven, the fact that
the transferee was an officer or was an agent or creditor
of an officer of an embarrassed corporate transferor,
the creation by an opposed debtor of a closely-held cor-
poration to receive the transfer of his property.
59
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York has stated:
"Actual intent . . . to hinder, delay or defraud either
present or future creditors . . ." is sufficient to render
conveyances fraudulent, and even "fair consideration"
cannot save conveyances made under the circumstances
proscribed by [UFCA section on actual intent]. The
requisite intent under this section need not be proven
by direct evidence but may be inferred (a) where the
transferor has knowledge of the creditor's claim and
knows that he is unable to pay it; (b) where the con-
veyance is made without fair consideration; or (c) where
the transfer is made to a related paity (i.e., husband to
wife, corporation to stockholder).60
If these statements are accepted at face value, it seems that
not only would the same facts that result in a fraudulent con-
veyance under section 67d(2)(a) also give rise to a fraudulent
conveyance under the actual-intent-to-defraud provision, but
even less would suffice under certain circumstances. For exam-
ple, if fair consideration is not present in granting a guaranty
and/or security interest collateralizing that guaranty, the forego-
59 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.37, at 539-43 (14th ed. 1975) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis supplied).
60 United States v. 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. 287 F. Supp. 475, 498 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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ing quotation implies that actual intent to defraud may be found
if the transferor is insolvent in the equity sense-that is, if the
transferor is unable to pay liabilities as they mature 6 '-even if it
is not insolvent as defined by the statute. In fact, the court ap-
pears to say that there need not be any kind of insolvency pres-
ent. Although section 67d(2)(a) would permit a security interest
in the guarantor's assets, no matter how grossly in excess of the
guarantied amount, as long as insolvency as defined in the
statute did not result, the foregoing quotations indicate that
such gross disparity may constitute actual intent to defraud, or at
least to delay, creditors, without regard to the solvency or insol-
vency of the transferor.
Notwithstanding the language of the textwriters and some
courts, an examination of the case law decided under this provi-
sion, none of which is particularly analogous to the situation at
hand, indicates that a finding of actual intent to defraud usually
entails the existence of more than a single "badge of fraud." The
usual process is to examine a series of misdeeds existing under
particular circumstances and to conclude that the series is suffi-
cient to establish the required intent to defraud. 62 It is unlikely
that the existence of a single "badge," particularly one that is an
element necessary to establish presumptive fraud under the
other provisions, is sufficient to establish such a presumption
here. Nevertheless, both the statutory language and loose lan-
guage in various opinions exist, and the possibility of crossing
the line into actual intent should never be ignored. After getting
a cross-corporate guaranty, security for the guaranty, plus a
few "something elses"-or perhaps even a single "something
else"-the lender may find itself deemed to be a participant in
an actually fraudulent scheme.
IV. THE SAVING PROVISION
If a guaranty or lien is found to be fraudulent under any of
the foregoing provisions, the remedy provided in both the
6 See, e.g., Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 303 (1944).
62 See, e.g., In re Allied Dev. Corp., 435 F.2d 372, 373 (7th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Leggett, 292 F.2d 423, 427 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961); Chorost v.
Grand Rapids Factory Show Rooms, Inc., 172 F.2d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 1949); In re Peoria
Braumeister Co., 138 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1943); Lackawanna Pants Mfg. Co. v.
Wiseman, 133 F.2d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 1943); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc. 236 F.
Supp. 333, 348 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
957 (1967); Gafco, Inc. v. H.D.S. Mercantile Corp., 47 Misc. 2d 661, 263 N.Y.S.2d 109
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1965).
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UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act is the avoidance of the transfer. 63
In other words, the lien simply will be invalidated and the
guaranty rendered unenforceable. A saving provision can be
found, however, under both the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act.
The UFCA provides: "A purchaser who without actual fraudu-
lent intent has given less than a fair consideration for the con-
veyance or obligation, may retain the property or obligation as
security for repayment. ' 64 This differs subtly from the Bank-
ruptcy Act provision:
A transfer made or an obligation incurred by a
debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this Act, which is
fraudulent under this subdivision against creditors of
such debtor having claims provable under this Act, shall
be null and void against the trustee, except as to a bona
fide purchaser, lienor, or obligee for a present fair equiv-
alent value: . ..And provided further, That such pur-
chaser, lienor, or obligee, who without actual fraud-
ulent intent has given a consideration less than fair,
as defined in this subdivision (d), for such transfer,
lien, or obligation, may retain the property, lien, or
obligation as security for repayment.65
Some authority supports the proposition that "purchaser"
in the UFCA is probably as broad in its coverage as "purchaser,
lienor or obligee" in the Bankruptcy Act.6 6 The Bankruptcy
Act, however, unlike the UFCA, limits protection to purchasers,
lienors, or obligees for a "present fair equivalent value." Thus,
although an antecedent debt constitutes fair consideration for
a transfer under both the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act, if the
transaction is otherwise fraudulent, the language of the Act in-
dicates that protection is rendered only to the transferee for a
present fair consideration. Even though, for example, a guaran-
ty and lien on the assets of the subsidiary of a borrower, given
subsequent to the loan in a work-out situation, may be fair con-
sideration under the fair consideration and insolvency provi-
sion, nevertheless, if the transaction is voided because it is found
63 UFCA, supra note 8, at § 9(1); Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(6)
(1970).
64 UFCA § 9(2).
" Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(6) (1970) (emphasis on "bona fide"
and "present" supplied).
" See, e.g., City of New York v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1943) (lien creditor
deemed to be a purchaser within the meaning of the statute).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:235
to have been made with actual intent to defraud, no protection
will be afforded the lender under the Bankruptcy Act version
to the extent that the consideration for the lien was monies pre-
viously advanced to the parent.
Collier, however, arguing that the language should not be
read so literally, states, "If the antecedent debt amounts to a fair
equivalent of the property transferred therefor, the transfer will
presumably be upheld in full, although the transferee is techni-
cally not a 'bona-fide purchaser, lienor, or obligee for a present
fair equivalent value.' ",67 Although this result is reasonable, it
can be reached only by ignoring express statutory language. Re-
liance on this interpretation therefore cannot be advised safely.
The existence of actual fraudulent intent is a crucial issue
here as it was in section 67d(2)(d),68 and courts do not seem to
have fashioned separate tests for actual intent under the two
sections.69 Clearly, actual fraudulent intent should not be
equated with the lack of good faith that results in lack of fair
consideration under the statute. Although the existence of good
faith necessarily precludes actual fraudulent intent, the absence
of good faith does not indicate actual fraudulent intent. A pur-
chaser who lacks good faith, however, may not be a "bona fide"
purchaser as required by the Bankruptcy Act's saving provision
and therefore may be precluded from successfully invoking
it.70 The UFCA's saving provision does not, by its terms, require
that the purchaser be "bona fide."
V. PROPOSALS FOR STRUCTURING LENDING TRANSACTIONS
It is sometimes possible to structure loans to a group of
corporations in such a way as to minimize the effect of the prob-
lems analyzed in this Article. In this endeavor, the guiding prin-
ciple is to make certain that the loan is made and that the con-
6" 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.41, at 598 (14th ed. 1975).
6" See notes 56-60 supra & accompanying text.
65 Cf. In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (finding of actual
intent under § 67d(2)(d) precludes application of § 67d(6)).
The leading case on the interpretation of this proviso states, "Actual fraudulent
intent requires a conscious realization by the lienor that taking the lien will work a fraud
on the debtor's creditors," In re Peoria Braumeister Co., 138 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir.
1943). Of course, this may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Also, the appropriate
standard is inquiry notice, so a failure to ask the obvious question may jeopardize the
transaction. See cases cited in 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.41, at 596-97 (14th ed.
1975).
70 See In re Allied Dev. Corp., 435 F.2d 372, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1970).
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sideration passes to those entities owning the assets upon which
the lender relies in making the positive credit determination.
This result can be achieved in a variety of ways, depending
on the facts and the goals to be met. Sometimes, the problems
can be avoided entirely in the parent-subsidiary context by lend-
ing to the subsidiary, rather than to the parent corporation, with
a secured "downstream" guaranty running from the parent to
the lender. As noted, fair consideration certainly should be
found when there is a "downstream" guaranty. 71 In addition, the
parent can be required to waive its right of subrogation to the
lender's claim against the subsidiary if the parent is called upon
to honor its commitment, and the subsidiary can then pass the
loan proceeds to the parent, in appropriate circumstances, by
way of dividends and loans or repayment of intercompany
indebtedness. The net effect of this procedure is precisely the
same as if the loan were made to the parent and secured by the
assets of the entire group of corporations.
7 2
A particular problem area is presented by loans to finance
acquisitions or to pay off acquisition debt, for clearly, in such a
situation, the guarantying subsidiaries of the acquiring parent
receive no consideration. Again, the technique described in the
preceding paragraph may be effective, as long as the entity to
which the loan is actually made is solvent. An alternative route to
avoid "upstream" guaranty problems in the acquisition debt con-
text is the merger technique. If the acquired subsidiary is
merged into the borrower simultaneously with the loan transac-
tion, and the lender takes a lien on the assets of the borrower,
the net result is a first lien on the assets of the formerly inde-
pendent, acquired entity, which now belong to the borrower. At
the same time, the other subsidiaries can be merged into the
parent corporation. As long as the combined entity emerges sol-
vent, the creditors of the formerly independent subsidiaries can-
71 See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
72 Several recent lawsuits suggest that some problems associated with this approach
may arise in the future. In connection with the Penn Central and the North American
Acceptance Corporation bankruptcies, suits were commenced alleging that the parent
corporation operated the subsidiary corporation exclusively for its own benefit, with the
consent and cooperation of the lender. In the North American Acceptance Corporation
case, the trustee alleged that that corporation's parent, Omega-Alpha, Inc., caused its
subsidiary to borrow $9,000,000 from Chase Manhattan Bank and First National City
Bank and then to loan the money to Omega-Alpha for five years on an unsecured note,
even though North American's note with the bank was fully secured. The complaint
sought damages against the Chase Manhattan Bank for participating in an allegedly
fraudulent scheme. The Penn Central litigation was settled, and the North American
litigation is pending.
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not complain; a collateralized guaranty by the same corporations
as independent entities, however, would be subject to all of the
problems discussed above. Of course, this merger technique may
be employed outside the acquisition context as well.
For tax or other motives, the borrower may insist that the
acquired assets remain in a subsidiary and that the merger ap-
proach cannot be used. In such a case, the acquisition may be
structured as a purchase of assets, with the lender taking a se-
curity interest in all of the borrower's assets, including those
just purchased. Thereafter, or simultaneously, the purchased
assets may be transferred, with the lender's permission and sub-
ject to the lender's lien, to a newly formed subsidiary in ex-
change for the stock of that subsidiary. Subsequently, to assure
complete protection by putting potential creditors of the new
subsidiary on notice of the lender's lien, and not for credit pur-
poses, the lender may want to obtain from the subsidiary a
guaranty collateralized by a second lien on its assets, with ap-
propriate notice of the lien filed or recorded. Thus, there would
be no existing creditors of the subsidiary to complain of the lien,
and subsequent creditors would be on notice thereof.
A different situation occurs when a parent and its sub-
sidiaries constitute an integrated operation and the parent actu-
ally funds the operations of its subsidiaries. In such a case, when
the purpose of a loan is to provide operating capital for a parent
and all of its subsidiaries, the lender, for example, could enter
into an accounts receivable financing arrangement with the par-
ent and its subsidiaries, under which the subsidiaries would con-
tinually hypothecate their accounts receivable to the parent,
which in turn would pledge them to the lender. If cash flow pro-
jections for each subsidiary indicate that any advances from the
lender would be distributed to the subsidiaries substantially pro-
portionate to the generation of receivables, each subsidiary most
likely would receive fair consideration from the parent in ex-
change for the hypothecation of its receivables.
In appropriate circumstances, a lender, of course, may be
able to rely on "upstream" or "cross-stream" guaranties. When,
for example, the guaranty is in an amount that will not even
approach rendering the entity insolvent, no fraudulent con-
veyance question is presented.
Notwithstanding the foregoing suggestions for loan struc-
turing, no foolproof formulation can be set forth that would
insulate the lender from any conceivable legal challenges to its
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right to seek repayment from the guarantying entity. "Actual
intent to delay, hinder, or defraud" present or future creditors
always lingers on the horizon if a lender goes too far. Of course,
it is impossible to predict with certainty when a court would find
fraud in fact as opposed to fraud presumed by law. Further-
more, it is impossible to state exactly what assets, liabilities, and
valuations a court would consider relevant to its determination
of the solvency or insolvency of the entities in question on the
date of the transaction. Nevertheless, recognizing the foregoing
potential difficulties, the approaches outlined above are de-
signed to avoid the significant possibility of invalidity associated
with a typical "upstream" or "cross-stream" guaranty situation.
Although the safest advice is that the lender should treat the
availability of the assets of a subsidiary or affiliated corporation
for repayment of the obligations of the borrower as a bonus
rather than a necessity, the foregoing approaches at least rep-
resent some steps that can aid in the achievement of the desired
result.
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